JITE - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. Vol. 177 & 178 (2021/2022)

Edited by Ralph-C. Bayer & Gerd Muehlheusser. Redaktion: Regine Hallmann.

Insgesamt 35 Aufsätze, alle in englischer Sprache. Das Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), gegründet 1844 als Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, beschäftigt sich als eine der ältesten Zeitschriften in Bereich der Volkswirtschaftslehre traditionell mit Problemen der Wirtschaftswissenschaft, der Sozialpolitik und ihrer Rechtsstrukturen. - Contents: Vol. 177: Christina E. Bannier, Eberhard Feess, Natalie Packham, Markus Walzl: Differentiation and Risk Aversion in Imperfectly Competitive Labor Markets. - Chulyoung Kim, Sang-Hyun Kim: Exoneree Compensation and Endogenous Plea Bargaining: Theory and Experiment. - Adriana Alventosa, Gonzalo Olcina: Rich and Poor. On the Emergence of a Sanctioning Institution. - Marcus Dittrich, Silvio Städter: Regulating Executive Pay: Incentive Contracts and Nonbinding Bonus Caps. - Bertrand Crettez, Olivier Musy: The Paradox of Legal Unification. - Soham Baksi, Pinaki Bose, Marc T. Law: Coercion, Obnoxious Tasks, and Economic Efficiency. -- David J. Acheson, Ansgar Wohlschlegel: Libel Bullies, Defamation Victims, and Litigation Incentives. - Werner Güth, Oliver Kirchkamp: Believing in Corporate Social Responsibility. An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis. - Kathrin Thiemann, Niklas Wallmeier: Peer Effects under Different Relative Performance Feedback and Grouping Procedures. - Martin Richardson, Frank Stähler: Some Economics of Echo Chambers. - Stephen J. Cotten, Youping Li, Rudy Santore: Social Preferences and Collusion. A Laboratory Experiment. -- Xu Jiang: Are Interim Performance Evaluations Optimal when the Evaluations are Subject to Manipulation? - Sreeparna Saha, Prabal Roy Chowdhury, Jaideep Roy, Grazyna Wiejak-Roy: Institutional Imperfections and Buyer-Induced Holdout in Land Acquisition. - Ziad Ghandour: Public-Private Competition in Regulated Markets. - Debasmita Basak: Price Competition and the Effects of Labour Unions on Innovation. - Damien Besancenot, Karine Lamiraud, Radu Vranceanu: Balance Billing as an Adherence-to-Treatment Signalling Device. -- Nuno Garoupa, Adrián Segura: Are you Injurer or Victim? Liability for Accidents under Role-Type Uncertainty. - Robin Christmann: Prosecution and Conviction under Hindsight-Biased Information Updating in Adversary Legal Systems. - Ruoya Wang, Yaodong Zhou: Can R&D Input Influence Market Power? Facts about China's Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Industry. - Youjin Hahn, Chulyoung Kim, Sang-Hyun Kim: Endowment Effects in Proposal Rights Contests. - Ferdinand A. von Siemens: Gender Diversity and Productive Signaling in the Workplace. --- Vol. 178: Julien Jacob, Eve-Angéline Lambert, Serge Garcia: Efficiency of Liability-Sharing Rules. An Experimental Case. - Changying Li, Youping Li, Jianhu Zhang: Advertising and Price Competition in the Presence of Overlapping Ownership. - Tim Friehe, Christoph Rössler: Damage Measures for Contract Breach when Buyers Have Reference-Dependent Preferences. - Jingping Li, Yohanes E. Riyanto: Gender Differences in the Pursuit of Prestige in Charitable Giving. An Experiment. -- Luigi Alberto Franzoni: Prevention Policy in an Uncertain Environment. - Julien Jacob, Marielle Brunette, Louis Eeckhoudt: Prevent or Cure? Trading in the Face of Skewed Binary Lotteries. - Nuno Garoupa, Fernando Gómez-Pomar, Adrián Segura: Ideology and Career Judges. Reviewing Labor Law in the Spanish Supreme Court. - Malte Griebenow, Mathias Kifmann: Diagnostics and Treatment. On the Division of Labor between Primary Care Physicians and Specialists. -- Stefan Napel, Dominik Welter: Relative Responsibility for Cartel Damages. - Kojun Hamada: A Duopoly of Strategic CSR Firms. - Simon Cornée, Marc Jegers, Ariane Szafarz: Feasible Institutions of Social Finance. A Taxonomy. -- Alexander Rodivilov, Dongsoo Shin, Xiaojian Zhao:Overachieving and Obsessive Behavior as Signaling Devices under Career Concern. - Aya Elewa: Capacity Constraints, Collusion, and Trade Liberalization. - Rein Haagsma: Do Higher Public Wages Reduce Corruption? The Force of Redistributive Norms. - Zwei vollständige Jahrgänge in acht Ausgaben, zus. X,[VIII],885 Seiten mit einigen Abb. und Tab., broschiert (JITE - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; Vol. 178/179 (2021/2022)/Mohr Siebeck 2021-2023) leichte Lagerspuren/minor shelfwear